Differentiating strategies of success
Nature of competition
Prior to the 90s Airbus was only determined as a niche in the market, apart from manufacturing a very reliable and efficient aircraft (Campos, 2001). According to Kotler (2003) the percentage that each position hypothetically assumes in the market structure is 40% for leader, 30% for Challenger, 20% for follower, and 10% for niche. Hence Airbus niche market begin at 10% back in 70s century and expand its market share up half of the commercial airliner manufacturing market landscape in the 20th century. From the beginning, the market consists of Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, Lockheed, and Airbus. Even then Boeing refused to include Airbus in its future market forecasts, assuming that the 10% market share of the A300 was no more than a passing phenomenon, soon to be forgotten, just as the other earlier European jetliners (Campos, 2001). Whilst by the 2000s Boeing and Airbus remain as duopoly in the aviation market with Boeing and McDonnell Douglas acquisition, and Lockheed resignation from the civil jetliners into the military domain only. By now Boeing realized its technical complacency had allowed a challenger “Airbus” to come from nowhere to a permanent market position (Campos, 2001). And for the first time Boeing will deploy its full technical competence against Airbus.